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　Japan has faced a long-term population decline.  The population growth rate has 
been steadily decreasing over the past two decades and mostly below zero since 2006 
(World Bank).  A serious problem occurs in the rural areas of Japan, suffering aging and 
shrinking population.  A long-lasting trend for younger generations to migrate to the urban/
metropolitan areas has caused rural depopulation.  Only older people remain in rural areas 
causing the median age to rise.  In our study site, Kumakogen town, the population had 
dropped by 18.9 percent between 2000 and 2010 (Statistics Bureau Japan, 2000; 2010).  The 
percentage of residents older than 65 years of age was 44.9 percent in 2010, which was 22 
percent higher than the national average in the same year (Statistics Bureau Japan, 2010). 
As a result of rural depopulation, a non-negligible number of rural communities have been 
endangered and many more are expected to disappear in the near future (Rural Development 
Planning Commission, 2006).
　We use a survey of over 100 community leaders in rural mountainous villages to 
document local community structure and characteristics.  Understanding the structure of 
local community in rural villages might shed light on the role of community institutions 
and provide lessons for maintaining cooperation between villagers for collective action 
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(Ostrom, 1990; Rustagi et al., 2010).  We consider collective action in forest management 
as an example.  In Japan, most non-industrial private forest (NIPF) landowners have lost 
their motivation for timber production since timber prices began to decline.  To maintain 
forestry activities in Japanese rural areas, joint forest management has received increasing 
attention as economies of scale reduce operating costs and one can expect efficient collective 
management (Mitani et al., 2013).  In this paper, we explore how observed community 
characteristics explain resident NIPF landowners' participation in a joint forest management 
program.
　Our survey reveals some interesting facts about the structure and characteristics of rural 
communities in Kumakogen town in Ehime, Japan.  The median community size is 14 
households, which is quite small and consistent with rural depopulation and also suggests 
potentially strong social interactions within the community members (Hare et al., 1965). 
93 percent of households are members of local community organizations.  95 percent of 
organizations in the town have collective action/management agreements, and more than 30 
percent of them have an enforcement instrument using a monetary penalty.  Some institution 
characteristics, such as the frequency of community meetings and collective decision rules 
they employ, vary among communities.
　We use actual contract data from Kuma Joint Thinning Program to test the influence 
of observed community characteristics on the likelihood of resident forest landowners' 
participation in collective management (Mitani et al., 2013).  Our econometric analysis 
shows that the community-level characteristics have statistically significant association 
with the likelihood.  Community size, the frequency of community meetings, and a lack of 
community forest have statistically significant positive effects on the likelihood.  The result 
suggests that NIPF landowners who live in a community employing a majority approval rule 
for a leader's proposal are more likely to participate.  We also confirm that the result is robust 
after controlling for other forest resource and landowners characteristics.
2. Study Site
　Our study site, Kumakogen  town,  is  located in  the center of  Ehime  prefecture (33°
39'N, 132°54'E), approximately 600 km southwest of Tokyo.  The town is very mountainous and has 
43,023 ha private forestland, which is 73.7 percent of the total land in the town.  The resident 
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population of the town is 9,327 and 45.3 percent of them are older than 65 years of age.  The 
town is constituted by four villages: Kuma, Omogo, Mikawa, and Yanadani.  In total there 
are 219 local communities in the town: 119 in Kuma, 10 in Omogo, 59 in Mikawa, and 31 in 
Yanadani.  Many communities are remote and isolated.  
　To explore how resident NIPF landowners' collective decision-making can be attributable 
to the observed community characteristics, we merged our survey data with actual contract 
data from the Kuma Joint Thinning Program (KJTP) for landowners' decision as a dependent 
variable of interest.  Landowners' participation decision can be considered as a coordination 
problem between neighboring landowners because joint thinning operations, which provide 
benefits to participants, can be implemented only when the number of participants in the 
neighboring area or the total enrolled contiguous area reaches a certain threshold (Mitani et 
al., 2013). 
3. Survey of Community Leaders
Design and Administration
　We conducted a mail survey by approaching all 219 community leaders during July 
and August 2014, after early versions of the survey instrument were reviewed by local 
administrators.  The number of responses was 115 with the overall response rate of 52.5 
percent.  A 3-page questionnaire consisted of three sections.  The first section contained 
questions inquiring some statistics about his/her community and organization.  We observed 
the number of households in a local community (Comsize), the percent of households holding 
community organization membership (Memrate), and the number of community meetings per 
year (Freqmeet).  
　The second part contained questions regarding collective action in his/her community. 
We asked whether his/her community has collective action or management agreements 
(Collect), whether his/her community has an enforcement instrument using a monetary fee 
(Penalty), and how much the fee is (Penaltyfee).  We also asked whether his/her community 
has a community forest (Comforest).  In addition, community leaders were asked what kind 
of collective decision rules they have used in their community organizations.  We observed 
whether his/her community employs majority voting (Majority), majority approvals for a 
leader's proposal (Approval), and consensus decision-making (Consensus).  
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　Following this, community leaders were asked questions related to households in their 
community, giving us the percentage of households living with younger generation members 
(Youngrate), the percentage of one-generation households (Onegrate), the percentage of 
households whose members are retired (Retiredrate), the percentage of immigrated (i.e. not 
native) households (Immigrate), and the percentage of households having city workers or 
commuters (Commutrate).  
Results of Descriptive Statistics
　The first sets of variables report characteristics of community organizations.  Table 
1 presents the descriptive statistics of community size (Comsize), membership rates 
(Memrate), and the frequency of community meetings (Freqmeet) by four villages.  The 
median community size is 14 households in the town, which is small and consistent with 
rural depopulation whereas might suggest strong social interactions within the community 
members.  The community organization membership rate is quite high.  The number of 
community meetings per year ranges from 0 to 24 with high standard deviation. 
　The second sets of variables describe characteristics of collective action.  Table 2 shows 
the descriptive statistics of collective agreements (Collect), an enforcement instrument 
(Penalty), the amount of penalty fee (Penaltyfee), and a community forest (Comforest).  Almost 
all community organizations in the town have collective action or management agreements. 
More than 30 percent of them have an enforcement instrument using a monetary penalty. 
Table １． Descriptive Statistics on Community Organizations
Variable Villages Nobs Mean S.D. Min Max
Comsize Total 109 17.7 13.0 1 86
Kuma 56 19.2 11.0 3 50
Omogo 5 32.0 32.1 5 86
Mikawa 28 13.0 7.34 1 32
Yanadani 20 16.4 15.0 4 69
Memrate Total 109 0.93 0.10 0.5 1
Kuma 56 0.93 0.10 0.57 1
Omogo 5 0.84 0.17 0.57 1
Mikawa 28 0.94 0.09 0.7 1
 Yanadani 20 0.94 0.13 0.5 1
Freqmeet Total 109 6.50 5.20 0 24
Kuma 57 5.21 4.41 0 20
Omogo 4 14.5 3.79 12 20
Mikawa 28 5.32 4.41 0 15
 Yanadani 20 10.2 5.64 3 24
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Among four villages, Mikawa village has a higher share of communities having an 
enforcement mechanism.  A community member has to pay the penalty fee when he/she is 
not able to cooperate for collective management.  The median of the fee is 3,000 JPY while 
the mode is 5,000 JPY.  Almost half of communities have community forest.  
　Table 3 reports the descriptive statistics of majority voting (Majority), majority approval 
for a leader's proposal (Approval), and consensus decision-making (Consensus).  The 
percentage of communities using majority voting as a collective decision rule is highest 
while the percentage of them using majority approval for a leader's proposal is lowest.  Local 
organizations employing an approval rule might have different community structures because 
Table ２．Descriptive Statistics on Collective Action（1）
Variable Villages Nobs Mean S.D. Min Max
Collect Total 110 0.95 0.23 0 1
Kuma 57 0.95 0.23 0 1
Omogo 5 1.00 0.00 1 1
Mikawa 28 0.93 0.26 0 1
Yanadani 20 0.95 0.22 0 1
Penalty Total 109 0.33 0.47 0 1
Kuma 56 0.29 0.46 0 1
Omogo 5 0.20 0.45 0 1
Mikawa 28 0.50 0.51 0 1
 Yanadani 20 0.25 0.44 0 1
Penaltyfee Total 31 3569 2302 500 8800
Kuma 15 3177 2155 900 7000
Omogo 1 8800 8800 8800
Mikawa 12 3333 1723 1000 5000
Yanadani 3 4733 3669 500 7000
Comforest Total 107 0.41 0.49 0 1
Kuma 56 0.34 0.48 0 1
Omogo 5 0.80 0.45 0 1
Mikawa 27 0.56 0.51 0 1
Yanadani 19 0.32 0.48 0 1
community leaders have initiative for collective decision.
 　The last sets of variables document characteristics of resident households.  Table 4 shows 
the descriptive statistics of young household rates (Youngrate), one-generation household 
rates (Onegrate), retired household rates (Retiredrate), immigrated household rates (Immigrate), 
and city worker rates (Commutrate).
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Table ３．Descriptive Statistics on Collective Action（2）
Variable Villages Nobs Mean S.D. Min Max
Majority Total 108 0.40 0.49 0 1
Kuma 56 0.43 0.50 0 1
Omogo 5 0.20 0.45 0 1
Mikawa 28 0.39 0.50 0 1
Yanadani 19 0.37 0.50 0 1
Approval Total 108 0.29 0.45 0 1
Kuma 56 0.25 0.44 0 1
Omogo 5 0.40 0.55 0 1
Mikawa 28 0.25 0.44 0 1
 Yanadani 19 0.42 0.51 0 1
Consensus Total 108 0.35 0.48 0 1
Kuma 56 0.39 0.49 0 1
Omogo 5 0.20 0.45 0 1
Mikawa 28 0.36 0.49 0 1
 Yanadani 19 0.26 0.45 0 1
Table ４．Descriptive Statistics on Resident Household Characteristics
Variable Villages Nobs Mean S.D. Min Max
Youngrate Total 106 0.09 0.15 0 1
Kuma 53 0.13 0.15 0 0.75
Omogo 5 0.05 0.06 0 0.15
Mikawa 28 0.08 0.19 0 1
Yanadani 20 0.02 0.03 0 0.09
Onegrate Total 104 0.57 0.31 0 1
Kuma 53 0.58 0.25 0 1
Omogo 5 0.73 0.25 0.41 1
Mikawa 26 0.60 0.35 0 1
 Yanadani 20 0.47 0.39 0 1
Retiredrate Total 100 0.43 0.26 0 1
Kuma 53 0.37 0.23 0 1
Omogo 5 0.43 0.13 0.26 0.6
Mikawa 23 0.49 0.30 0 1
Yanadani 19 0.54 0.28 0 0.89
Immigrate Total 105 0.07 0.17 0 1
Kuma 53 0.10 0.19 0 1
Omogo 5 0.03 0.04 0 0.08
Mikawa 27 0.06 0.19 0 1
 Yanadani 20 0.03 0.06 0 0.17
Commutrate Total 104 0.03 0.06 0 0.33
Kuma 54 0.04 0.05 0 0.2
Omogo 5 0.00 0.00 0 0
Mikawa 25 0.04 0.08 0 0.33
Yanadani 20 0.00 0.00 0 0




　In order to understand the community-specific determinants of resident forest landowners' 
participation in a joint management program, we merge our community-specific survey data 
with actual contract data from the KJTP provided by the Kuma Forest Association (Mitani et 
al., 2013).  The database contains almost 1,000 participants at the time of March 2011 with 
enrolled size in acres, enrolled year, and their forest size registered in a census.  
　Table 5 presents the variables used for our empirical test in this section with their 
descriptions, mean, and standard deviation.  Our dependent variable (Join) collected from the 
census data is a dummy variable equal to 1 if a landowner has enrolled in the program until 
March 2011 and 0 otherwise.  We estimate a logit regression with robust standard errors of 
the participation decision on the community characteristics variables in Model 1 and 2.  To 
control for observable differences in landowners and allow us to focus on the community-
specific determinants, we add a forest characteristics variable from the census data (Model 3) 
and four landowners' characteristics variables from forest owner survey data (Model 4) to the 
Table ５．Summary of Variables
Variable Descriptions Mean S. D.
Local Community Characteristics Variables (Local Community Survey Data)
Comsize the number of households in a local community 18.6 12.5
Memrate a rate of households with community organization membership 0.92 0.12
Freqmeet the number of community meetings per year 6.97 5.50
Collect a community has joint activity/management agreements 0.96 0.20
Comforest a community has community forest 0.44 0.20
Majority a community employs majority voting as a collective decision rule 0.44 0.50
Approval a community employs majority approval for a leader's proposal 0.29 0.45
Consensus a community employs a consensus rule 0.36 0.48
Youngrate a rate of households living with younger generation members 0.10 0.15
Onegrate a rate of one generation households 0.56 0.36
Retiredrate a rate of retired households 0.43 0.24
Immigrate a rate of immigrated households 0.07 0.16
Commutrate a rate of households having city workers/commuters 0.03 0.06
Census Joint-forest-management Variables (Census Data)
Join forest owner's participation decision in a JFM program 0.20 0.40
Forestsize forest size registered in a census (hectare) 6.89 12.3
Survey Forest Owner Characteristics Variables (Forest Owner Survey Data)
Border recognizing the border of property (1: not at all; 5: perfectly) 4.22 1.07
Timsale timber sales in the last 10 years 0.46 0.50
Male 0.88 0.32
Age  71.6 10.8
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Table ６．Estimation Results（1） 
Model 1 Model 2
Coef. S. E. P Coef. S. E. P
Comsize 0.048 0.012 0.000 0.041 0.009 0.000
Memrate -0.111 1.356 0.935
Freqmeet 0.059 0.027 0.028 0.045 0.021 0.033
Collect -2.215 0.697 0.001 -0.294 0.740 0.692
Comforest -1.039 0.303 0.001 -0.881 0.258 0.001
Majority -0.263 0.369 0.476
Approval 0.681 0.358 0.057 0.572 0.264 0.030
Consensus 0.054 0.362 0.881
Youngrate 1.004 1.329 0.450
Onegrate 0.148 0.500 0.767
Retiredrate 0.331 0.699 0.636
Immigrate -2.987 1.600 0.062 1.528 1.281 0.233
Commutrate 7.035 2.454 0.004 4.532 1.995 0.023
Const. -2.703 1.610 0.093 -3.984 1.091 0.000
LogLikelihood -207.0 -233.2
Pseudo R2 0.112 0.081
AIC 442.0 482.5
Nobs 449 487
independent variables in our regressions (Suzuki et al., 2013). 
　Table 6 reports the estimation results of Model 1 and 2.  These models contain only the 
community-specific variables observed by the survey.  The results suggest that community 
characteristics can be determinants of resident coordination decision.  The number of 
households in a community is positively associated with the likelihood of participation at 
the 1% risk level.  The frequency of community meetings is also positively associated with 
the likelihood at the 5% risk level.  A lack of community forest is positively associated 
with the likelihood at the 1% level.  The result suggests that landowners who belong to the 
community that uses majority approval for a leader's proposal as a collective decision rule 
are more likely to participate at the 5% level.
　Table 7 shows the estimation results of Model 3 and 4 in which the extra control variables 
are included.  Estimated coefficients are consistent with the previous findings of NIPF 
landowners' behavior (Mitani and Lindhjem, 2015).  The results confirm that our findings 
reported above are robust after controlling for other forest resource and landowners 
characteristics.




Model 3 Model 4
Coef. S. E. P Coef. S. E. P
Comsize 0.041 0.009 0.000 0.038 0.014 0.005
Freqmeet 0.043 0.022 0.044 0.062 0.030 0.039
Collect -0.314 0.762 0.680 -0.714 1.206 0.554
Comforest -0.885 0.263 0.001 -0.947 0.360 0.008
Approval 0.494 0.270 0.067 0.699 0.386 0.070
Immigrate 1.250 1.373 0.363 2.388 3.110 0.443
Commutrate 4.422 2.110 0.036 5.115 2.536 0.044
Forestsize 0.044 0.014 0.001 0.068 0.021 0.001
Border -0.206 0.161 0.201
Timsale -0.454 0.409 0.267
Male -0.971 0.533 0.068
Age -0.026 0.016 0.093
Const. -4.223 1.127 0.000 -0.280 1.852 0.880
LogLikelihood -227.0 -116.3




　Japanese rural villages suffer aging and shrinking population.  The rural areas of 
Japan have a number of small and tight communities.  Describing the structure of local 
communities in rural villages might reveal the role of community institutions and provide 
lessons for maintaining cooperation between neighbors for collective management (Ostrom, 
1990).  We implemented a survey of over 100 community leaders in rural mountainous 
villages in Kumakogen town to document local community structure and characteristics. 
For instance, we found that almost all communities in the town have collective action and/or 
management agreements and more than 30 percent of them have an enforcement instrument 
using a monetary penalty.  Regarding collective decision rules in a community, the survey 
result showed that about 40 percent of communities in the town employ majority voting, 
about 35 percent of them employ consensus decision-making, and less than 30 percent of 
them use majority approvals for a leader's proposal.
　As an application, we explored whether observed community characteristics explain 
resident NIPF landowners' participation behavior in a joint forest management program.  The 
survey data were merged with actual contract data of a joint forest management program 
in the town for resident landowners' participation decision in collective management.  Our 
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econometric analysis showed that some community-level characteristics have statistically 
significant association with the likelihood of participation.  Community size, the frequency 
of community meetings, and a lack of community forest have statistically significant positive 
effects on the likelihood.  The result suggests that NIPF landowners who live in a community 
employing majority approval for a leader's proposal are more likely to participate.  We also 
confirm that the result is robust after controlling for other forest resource and landowners 
characteristics.
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